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The orthodox view in contemporary epistemology is that Edmund Gettier refuted 
the JTB analysis of knowledge, according to which knowledge is justified true 
belief.1 In a recent paper Moti Mizrahi questions the orthodox view.2 According to 
Mizrahi, the cases that Gettier advanced against the JTB analysis are misleading. 
For, according to Mizrahi, they are cases of semantic failure (i.e., failure to refer to 
something) rather than epistemic failure (i.e., failure to know something). In this 
paper I defend the orthodox view.  
I should mention that Mizrahi discusses several ‘Gettier cases’ besides the 
two that Gettier originated. Mizrahi discusses Roderick Chisholm’s sheep case, 
Alvin Goldman’s fake barn case, and Bertrand Russell’s stopped clock case.3 It is 
Mizrahi’s opinion that all these cases are misleading. I disagree across the board, 
but for the sake of brevity I focus exclusively on Gettier’s two cases. These are 
genuine counterexamples to the JTB analysis, or so I contend. 
In Gettier’s first case, Smith comes to have strong evidence for believing 
that Jones is the man who will get the job and that Jones has ten coins in his 
pocket. Smith makes a rudimentary logical inference and says the following: 
(I) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. 
                                                                
1 Edmund Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23 (1963): 121-123. 
2 Moti Mizrahi, “Why Gettier Cases Are Misleading” Logos & Episteme. An International 
Journal of Epistemology VII, 1 (2016): 31-44. 
3 Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1966); Alvin 
Goldman, “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,” The Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 
771-791; Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1948). 
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It turns out that (I) is true, but not for the reasons that Smith thinks. For it 
turns out that Smith himself is the man who will get the job and that, 
unbeknownst to Smith, he also has ten coins in his pocket. Many have the strong 
intuition that Smith fails to know (I). Since Smith is justified in believing (I), we 
seem to have a counterexample to the JTB analysis. 
But this case is misleading, according to Mizrahi, because Smith wishes to 
refer to the coins in Jones’s pocket. Mizrahi invokes Saul Kripke’s famous 
distinction between semantic reference and speaker’s reference.4 Roughly, the 
semantic referent of an expression is the thing designated by the expression 
according to the conventions of the language. The speaker’s referent of an 
expression is the thing to which the speaker wishes to refer. Mizrahi argues that 
Gettier’s first case is one where the semantic referent of ‘coins’ differs from the 
speaker’s referent of ‘coins.’ The semantic referent is the set of coins in Smith’s 
pocket, whereas the speaker’s referent is the set of coins in Jones’s pocket.5 Since 
Smith fails to refer to the semantic referent of ‘coins,’ Gettier’s first case is an 
instance of reference failure. This makes the case misleading, according to 
Mizrahi, since “we may be confusing the fact that Smith fails to refer to what 
actually fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘coins,’ which is a 
semantic fact about the case, with an epistemic fact, namely that Smith doesn’t 
know that (I) is the case.”6 Mizrahi concludes that our intuition about Gettier’s 
first case should not be assigned much evidential weight. 
Central to Mizrahi’s argument is the possibility that we are confusing a 
certain kind of semantic failure with a certain kind of epistemic failure. This is 
supposed to explain our intuition about Gettier’s first case. But if this is the correct 
explanation of our intuition, then the intuition should be absent when there is no 
such semantic failure. Unfortunately for Mizrahi, it is easy to revise Gettier’s first 
case so that there is no such semantic failure. Suppose that Smith has strong 
evidence for believing that Jones is the man who will get the job and that Jones is 
handsome. We can suppose that Smith is justified in believing that Jones is 
handsome based on seeing Jones in person. Smith makes a rudimentary logical 
inference and says the following: 
(I*) The man who will get the job is handsome. 
                                                                
4 Saul Kripke, “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 
(1977): 255-276. 
5 Actually, it is far from clear that the semantic referent of ‘coins’ should be identified the 
specific set of coins in Smith’s pocket, but this is Mizrahi’s assertion, which I am willing to 
accept for present purposes.  
6 Mizrahi, “Why Gettier Cases,” 35. 
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It turns out that (I*) is true, but not for the reasons that Smith thinks. For it 
turns out that Smith is the man who will get the job and that, unbeknownst to 
Smith, he is also handsome. I cannot speak for everyone, but I have the strong 
intuition that Smith fails to know (I*). Since Smith is justified in believing (I*), we 
seem to have a counterexample to the JTB analysis. 
As far as I can tell, there is no semantic failure when Smith uses the 
predicate ‘is handsome.’ Of course, theorists have various different opinions 
regarding the semantics of predicates. But, according to standard accounts, the 
semantic referent of a monadic predicate is a certain property, set, or function. To 
simplify matters, let us assume that the semantic referent of ‘is handsome’ is the 
property handsomeness. There is no special reason to insist that Smith, when 
using this predicate, fails to designate this property. He is using the predicate in 
the same way that he typically uses the predicate, after all. Mizrahi might argue 
that Smith is referring to Jones’s handsomeness, rather than the general property 
handsomeness, and therefore there is semantic failure. But this argument would 
have very little plausibility. There are no independent grounds for making this 
argument, except that Smith intends to apply the predicate ‘is handsome’ to Jones. 
From this fact alone we should not conclude that there is semantic failure, unless 
we are prepared to conclude that many (most?) ordinary uses of the predicate are 
instances of semantic failure. When I say ‘The president of the United States is 
handsome,’ I intend to apply the predicate to Barack Obama. When I say ‘Ryan 
Gosling is handsome,’ I intend to apply the predicate to Ryan Gosling. When I say 
‘That guy is handsome,’ I intend to apply the predicate to that guy. Even though I 
have specific men in mind when I use the predicate, it would be inappropriate to 
insist that I have failed to designate the semantic referent of the predicate.  
In order for my case to parallel Gettier’s original case, I have stipulated that 
Smith does not know that the predicate ‘is handsome’ applies to himself.7 This 
might strike some readers as artificial, but it is not unrealistic to suppose that 
Smith is humble and therefore unaware of his own attractiveness. Of course, we 
can set up the case using different predicates. It seems to me that any monadic 
predicate would suffice, so long as Smith is justified in believing that the predicate 
applies to Jones, and Smith is unaware that the predicate also applies to himself. 
For example, we can set up the case using the predicate ‘is wealthy.’ For we can 
suppose that Smith is justified in believing that Jones is wealthy, but that Smith is 
                                                                
7 Personally, I do not believe that this stipulation is necessary to refute the JTB analysis. Even if 
the case is set up so that Smith knows that he is handsome, I have the intuition that Smith does 
not know (I*). Similarly, even if Gettier’s original case is set up so that Smith knows that he has 
ten coins in his pocket, I have the intuition that Smith does not know (I). 
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unaware that he himself is wealthy (unbeknownst to Smith, he has recently 
inherited a fortune from a deceased relative). We can set up the case using the 
predicate ‘is Canadian.’ For we can suppose that Smith is justified in believing that 
Jones is Canadian, but that Smith is unaware that he himself is Canadian (Smith is 
suffering from selective amnesia). None of these cases are plausible examples of 
semantic failure. All of these cases refute the JTB analysis of knowledge. 
But perhaps I am being too quick. Even though there is no semantic failure 
when Smith uses the relevant predicate, it is somewhat plausible that there is 
semantic failure when Smith uses the definite description ‘the man who will get 
the job.’ The speaker’s referent is Jones, whereas the semantic referent is Smith 
himself. This is not the kind of semantic failure emphasized by Mizrahi, but others 
have argued that it undermines Gettier’s first case.8 Does the possibility of this 
kind of semantic failure show that our intuition about Gettier’s first case should 
not be assigned much evidential weight? I think not. If this kind of semantic 
failure is the correct explanation of our intuition, then the intuition should be 
absent when there is no such semantic failure. But again it is easy to revise 
Gettier’s first case so that there is no such semantic failure. Suppose again that 
Smith has strong evidence for believing that Jones is the man who will get the job 
and that Jones is handsome. Smith performs an existential generalization and says 
the following: 
(I**) There is someone who is both getting a job and handsome. 
It turns out that (I**) is true, but not for the reasons that Smith thinks. For it 
turns out that (I**) is made true by Smith himself. Even though Smith is justified in 
believing (I**), and even though (I**) is true, I have the strong intuition that Smith 
fails to know (I**). This intuition cannot be explained by the kind of semantic 
failure discussed above, since no such semantic failure is present. We are dealing 
here with an existential generalization. There is no definite description whose 
semantic referent is Smith and whose speaker’s referent is Jones. There is no 
definite description whatsoever. 
                                                                
8 Adrian Heathcote, “Truthmaking and the Gettier Problem,” in Aspects of Knowing: 
Epistemological Essays, ed. Stephen Hetherington (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006), 151-168. Also 
relevant is Christoph Schmidt-Petri, “Is Gettier’s First Example Flawed?” in Knowledge and 
Belief, ed. W. Löffler and P. Weingartner (ALWS, 2003), 317-319. Note that Schmidt-Petri 
relies on Keith Donnellan’s distinction between the referential use of a description and the 
attributive use of a description, rather than Kripke’s more general distinction between speaker’s 
reference and semantic reference. See Keith Donnellan “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” 
The Philosophical Review (1966): 281-304.   
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Of course, there is some sense in which Smith has Jones in mind when 
inferring (I**), but this point seems irrelevant. The fact of the matter is that (I**) is 
an existential generalization, whose content does not include Jones (or anyone 
else). There is nothing to prevent Smith from believing (I**). Since this belief is 
justified and true, the relevant question is whether this belief counts as 
knowledge. Unless we insist that Smith does indeed know (I**), we must conclude 
with Gettier that the JTB analysis is false.9 
I turn finally to Gettier’s second case. In this case Smith has strong evidence 
for believing that Jones owns a Ford. His evidence is that “Jones has at all times in 
the past owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a 
ride while driving a Ford.”10 Smith makes a rudimentary logical inference and says 
the following: 
(h) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona 
In fact, Smith does not know Brown’s location. Still, Smith is justified in 
believing (h), since Smith inferred it from something else that he is justified in 
believing. It turns out that (h) it true, but not for the reasons that Smith thinks. 
The twist in this case is that Jones does not own a Ford, but, by sheer coincidence, 
Brown is in Barcelona. Many have the strong intuition that Smith fails to know 
(h). Since Smith is justified in believing (h), we seem to have a counterexample to 
the JTB analysis.  
This case is misleading, according to Mizrahi, because Smith wishes to refer 
to the person who has always owned a Ford, who has just offered him a ride while 
driving a Ford, and so on. This is the speaker’s referent of ‘Jones.’ Mizrahi argues 
that the speaker’s referent of ‘Jones’ must differ from the semantic referent of 
‘Jones.’ Unfortunately for Mizrahi, his argument betrays a serious 
misunderstanding of Gettier’s second case. Mizrahi sets up the case so that Smith 
comes to have evidence for believing 
(f) Jones owns a Ford 
                                                                
9 Someone might insist that Smith knows (I**) on independent grounds: there are so many 
handsome men in the world, it is reasonable to think that at least one of them is getting a job. 
But we can easily avoid this complication by replacing ‘is handsome’ with a predicate that 
applies to fewer people. Then Smith’s only justification for believing (I**) would have to do with 
Jones. Even then someone might insist that Smith knows (I**). I suspect that Christoph Schmidt-
Petri would insist that Smith knows (I**), though I am not certain (see “Is Gettier’s First Example 
Flawed?”). Since Schmidt-Petri’s remarks on Gettier are complicated, and since I am concerned 
specifically with Mizrahi’s argument, I must set the matter aside. Readers can decide for 
themselves whether it is plausible to insist that Smith knows (I**). 
10 Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge,” 122. 
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and then infers 
(g) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston 
and then, from (g), infers (h). According to Mizrahi, it is important that this case 
involves two separate inferences, the first from (f) to (g), and the second from (g) 
to (h). He argues that “the speaker’s reference of ‘Jones’ is the person who offered 
Smith a ride, has always owned a Ford, etc., whereas the semantic referent of 
Jones, i.e., the referent of ‘Jones’ that makes (g) true, cannot be that person, since 
Jones does not own a Ford, by stipulation.”11 In the first place, it is not clear why 
Mizrahi thinks that (g) must be true. But the more salient problem is that Gettier’s 
case does not involve an inference from (g) to (h). Gettier explicitly presents the 
case so that (h) is inferred directly from (f), by disjunction introduction. The 
source of Mizrahi’s confusion seems to be that Smith also infers (g) from (f). But 
this is an inessential feature of the case. Gettier introduces (g) only to emphasize 
the fact that Smith is selecting cities at random. In fact, as Gettier presented the 
case, Smith also infers the following from (f): 
(i) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk. 
Again we are not supposed to think that (i) is inferred from (g) or from (h). 
Instead we are supposed to think that (g), (h), and (i) are each inferred from (f). 
Smith believes each disjunction, and he is justified in believing each disjunction, 
since they are each inferred from something else that he is justified in believing. 
But only (h) happens to be true (unbeknownst to Smith!). 
So, contrary to Mizrahi’s presentation of the case, (g) is not true, and (h) is 
not inferred from (g). Furthermore, there are not two separate men, one of whom 
is the speaker’s referent of ‘Jones’ and one of whom is the semantic referent of 
‘Jones.’ There is only one man, the subject of (f). The case is such that Smith is 
justified in believing (f), even though (f) is false. We can assume that (f) is false 
because Jones has lost ownership of his old Ford and “is at present driving a rented 
car.”12 Nonetheless, Smith has correctly inferred (h) from (f), and (h) is made true 
by the fact that Brown is in Barcelona. There is no semantic failure in this case. 
When Smith uses ‘Jones,’ he is successfully and consistently referring to a single 
man, the semantic referent of ‘Jones.’ Mizrahi has provided no reason to suspect 
that our intuitions about this case are inaccurate, or that this case is ambiguous in 
any important respect.13 
                                                                
11 Mizrahi, “Why Gettier Cases,” 36. 
12 Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge,” 123. 
13 I am indebted to Rebecca Pluckhorn and Matt Griffin for helpful discussion. 
